I’ve been musing about President Barack Obama’s speech on the Middle East and North Africa for the past week: I like it, I like it not. And I still don’t have a clue what to make of it after listening to him on Sunday as he addressed the influential pro-Israel lobby group, American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

No doubt that the president gives fantastic speeches. The one on Thursday had two parts. In the first half, Obama has so many good points about the change sweeping the Arab world. In fact, I liked what I heard so much that I now feel sorry that he actually gave the speech. Why? Friends and colleagues are convinced that he could not have ignored the Israeli-Palestinian issue — but I wish he had. That’s the problem. In these two speeches, President Obama missed an opportunity to make two distinct points, and that bringing Israel up on Thursday muddled his message.

If the president hadn’t talked about Israel on Thursday, that first part of the speech would have been covered differently by the media, deservedly so. “The West was blamed as the source of all ills, a half-century after the end of colonialism,” Obama said. “Antagonism toward Israel became the only acceptable outlet for political expression.” Exactly. And the fact that the president of the United States finally spoke in the same language as his Middle Eastern counterparts — as crude as a Columbia and a Harvard Law School graduate can speak up — is remarkable.

If President Obama hadn’t introduced Israel into his Thursday remarks and had focused solely on the Arab uprisings, he still would be able to make his case very strongly, before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses Congress. But that didn’t happen. Netanyahu overreacted to Obama’s reference to the 1967 borders with mutually agreed swaps. On Sunday, the president had to bring clarity to his remarks, and provided extra assurances to Israel to calm it down. “The commitment of the United States to the security of Israel is ironclad,” Obama said. And there is nothing original about that — as well.

There’s no point in arguing about something that’s already done. But the point that I’m trying to make is that the White House should have known that the moment president talks about Israel, it makes headlines. Israel claims more interest and energy than nearly any other country, and now, as the Middle East undergoes remarkable transformation, people still can not give up from tying Israel to everything that’s going on in the region. For a change, though, the current Arab unrest has nothing to do with Israel.

“Some nations are blessed with wealth in oil and gas, and that has led to pockets of prosperity. But in a global economy based on knowledge, based on innovation, no development strategy can be based solely upon what comes out of the ground. Nor can people reach their potential when you cannot start a business without paying a bribe,” the president said. “If you take out oil exports, this entire region of over 400 million people exports roughly the same amount as Switzerland.”

Those issues command far less interest than the latest salvo between Obama and Netanyahu. The question is how to help people move toward a better life. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict unquestionably needs to be settled peacefully — but it’s just one of the Middle East’s issues. Even if that conflict were miraculously solved tomorrow, the Arab world would continue to sink into a dark hole of malfunction, using their energy and resources to go backward. But the people are demanding a new way forward.

The dilemma is what did these two speeches accomplish? Did we really need this theatrical show, with President Obama first appearing to side with the Palestinians? Is this serving the people of the region who have put everything on the line to effect change? It’s difficult to have an answer. But what’s clear is that the ones who were actually supposed to get a hit by the first half of the Thursday’s speech are playing the three monkeys — deaf, dumb and blind.

But if Obama had waited until the weekend to talk about Israel, who would have been the first to react to his speech? Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah? Or would the Saudis have said something? Or would Turkey, the region’s rising power, have spoken up? The Erdogan government certainly has trafficked in rhetoric that’s spiteful toward Israel, which created a bloody ordeal last year off the coast of Gaza. This year, the organizers of that flotilla will repeat their attempt to break the Gaza naval blockade. Obama said nothing about the coming danger or shared any insider knowledge as to whether or how he is trying to avert this upcoming crisis.

The president did not provide a concrete map outlining the steps he would undertake against Syria, or how long it will take for NATO to depose Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi. Nor did he share any thoughts about an approach to Yemen or Bahrain. But while it would be great to have simple, clear answers about the path forward, there’s not always clarity about what to do next. Well, sometimes, the way is blurry and unclear. Also, Obama was addressing not only the American people, but the people of the region as well — people who are used to hearing a lot of empty talk. He may not have moved things around, but he did give a speech that could have inspired people. Yet, now, like always, everyone is talking about Israel, Israel, and Israel — again.

As a result, his remarks raise more questions, such as why he didn’t mention Saudi Arabia — at all. Many people fixate on the workings of the Israeli lobby, but the Saudis influence Washington in a much more cunning way. They do their business silently and the U.S. lets them get away with a lot. They’re a different kind of a superpower: the world’s biggest oil producing country.

Alan Gerson, who represented 9/11 families in their lawsuit against the Saudi government, reminded me that after the bombing of U.S.S. Cole, it was the first time that the U.S. government really made the connection between terrorist financing and al-Qaeda. They knew that the money was the oxygen that allows it to work. The question was where was the oxygen coming from. And they discovered that it was principally coming from Saudi Arabia. Vice President Al Gore, who was also the head of National Security Planning Group, authorized to send a team to Riyadh almost a year before al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. They asked the Saudi authorities and the Saudi banks to shut it down. “The Saudi government did not stop the banks from doing it until after 9/11,” Gerson said. “It was too risky to allow it to continue afterwards.” This is just one example of Saudi behavior, totally separate from what they’re getting away with in Bahrain.

In brief, if Obama could not say a word to the Saudis because of their control over the world oil prices, he could have done without addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Thursday. On Sunday, it would have been a whole different story. In the meantime, the world’s media would have really been talking about what the president said about the Arab uprisings. But who knows, may be the White House purposely wanted to live this whole new drama with Netanyahu.

Saudi Arabia is an exceptional ally of the United States where American values and interests collide, and where Washington’s sincerity in supporting democracy and human rights is open to question. The Human Rights Watch reported today that the Saudi authorities have arrested since February 2011 over 160 peaceful protestors in violation of international human rights law. Like the three monkeys, though, the Obama administration publicly pretends to be deaf, blind and mute.

“It’s the oil,” tells me Peter Bergen, a terrorism analyst and author of Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Bin Laden. “Countries are not people. The relationships are mostly based on interests. We’re going to stick with the Saudis.” The reason is obvious. They have the world’s largest oil reserves. And the U.S. is heavily dependent on its relationship with Saudi Arabia to keep oil prices manageable and to help fight terrorism.

The problem, however, is that we have been calling the Saudis “moderate” – defying what being “moderate” really means when it comes to religious practices. In this context, all it means is that the Saudis are a committed ally of the U.S.

When the majority of the 9/11 hijackers turned out to be Saudi nationals, however, many realized that calling Saudis moderate did not do justice to the term.  The U.S. media felt completely free to strongly criticize the Saudis, and the Kingdom’s image soared. The Saudis created a full-court press of public relations, but it turned out to be ineffective. So they came up with a cunning diplomatic plan.

The Saudi initiative, later accepted as the Arab initiative, aimed to bring a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the Saudis showed themselves to be key in solving this long-term conflict, they also knew how to silence their American critics – and suddenly the negative press subsided. It’s clear that this issue is being used as a distraction for numerous reasons.

When the Middle East is transforming so rapidly, however, it is not clear what will save the Saudi Kingdom this time. “Who thought that Libya was immune from the Arab awakening,” says Bergen. “Two years down the road, it is possible [that they are forced to make changes.] There are ways for these monarchies to change. They can become constitutional monarchies. There are no constitutional dictatorships, right? They’re also able to bribe their citizens.”

Indeed, King Abdullah ordered a massive development and state welfare payment for the people in February easily excessing 35 billion dollars. Still, time will show whether money can buy everything. But one thing is clear: When the Israelis go to the polls next time to change their government, it will be a routine practice for them.

When I sat down with Ihsanoglu, I wondered about the OIC position on the Bahraini government’s crackdown on its Shiite led opposition, I expected to hear some self-criticism of the Islamic world, and some expression of concern over sectarian-based politics. I hoped to hear an admission of trouble in the Muslim world that needs to be addressed. But it did not happen. I was disappointed, and wondered if that was even a reasonable expectation when speaking to someone whose organization not only is based in Riyadh, but also represents Iran as well.

When asked about the Bahraini government’s approach to the protesters, which moved from a “severe crackdown” to “vindictive,” Ihsanoglu blamed the U.S. invasion and American policies in Iraq for creating sectarian conflict. “Prior to that, Saddam Hussein treated everyone badly,” he said. “Yet Shiites and Kurds and all others worked in his government. They were all equally mistreated.” When I reminded him that the Iraqis came to Washington separated as Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Shiites to lobby for a regime change, Ihsanoglu said, “Up until the (2003) intervention, Iraqis thought of themselves first as Iraqis and then as Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds, or Turcomans. But it was never their primary identity. Their sectarian and ethnic differences came as their second and even third identity. Yet the ones who lobbied here used those differences, and when the U.S. put a new system in place they built it on those differences. What the French did in Lebanon 90 years ago, the U.S. did in Iraq eight years ago.”

Ihsanoglu did not claim that the U.S. invented the sectarian conflict, but he did argue that the Bush administration consciously pushed for it. And he explained the OIC’s efforts to reconcile Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq. “In 2006, we succeeded in bringing together Sunni and Shiite leaders while sectarian violence was at its peak,” he said. “We made them sign on a 10-point agreement. We brought an end to claims such as, ‘I’m a Shiite, therefore I’m right,’ or ‘I’m a Sunni, therefore I’m right.’ That conflict came to an end religiously…Yet, the Iraqis are now politically divided just like in Lebanon.”

Although there may be different viewpoints over whether that religious conflict has ended, Ihsanoglu claimed that this is the legitimate truth; an objective analysis of the past decade and that U.S. policies caused the sectarian conflict to emerge. “[But] we’re against turning these issues into sectarian ideologies or make it part of a political confrontation,” he said. “What we say concerning Bahrain or elsewhere, the political issues need to be resolved in political frameworks. There should be a clear distance between politics and religion, and one should not intervene in the other; because it could take us to very dangerous places. We lived it in Iraq, and we don’t want to relive it again. If you bring religion into politics, things become bloody. We don’t want to see blood being spilled over again.”

But how do we prevent it from happening? Hammering American policies in Iraq is merely a distraction from the long-term oppression of Shiites in Sunni-ruled dictatorships. The majority of the countries that Ihsanoglu represents actually mix religion and politics. The bottom line is that as long as the Sunnis dominate the power centers of these regimes, they don’t care about the others. The Shiites outside Iran have been put down for far too long, and have been pushed to accept their place. They do have legitimate grievances that cannot be denied. Bahrain has a Shiite majority population, but the Sunnis rule it.

King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa introduced reforms a decade ago, including a parliamentary system. But the districts have been gerrymandered to produce an automatic Sunni majority every election, and now the Shiites want to be politically active. The Arab awakening does not discriminate against the Shiites – and each time they attempt to do something, they’re blamed to be Iranian agents. The U.S.–Saudi relationship is being tested in Bahrain, as Saudis have enjoyed U.S. support for so long that they want to make sure that they’re being favored at every turn, at any cost. If the U.S. sides with the people and makes its values a priority, it’s impossible to deny the legitimate grievances of Shiites and other minorities in the Muslim world.

The Bahraini government announced last Thursday that it would close al-Wifaq, the Shiite opposition party, but it didn’t follow through – possibly due to outside pressure. With all the measures being taken against the opposition, or the threats of punitive measures against the party, the Kingdom’s reforms have been rendered meaningless. In the last election, al Wifaq ran for 18 seats and won all of them. When the protests began two months ago, they submitted their resignations; but Parliament accepted only 11 of them. According to the Bahraini constitution, an election must take place in 60 days from the day those resignations became effective. But under these circumstances, who would take Bahraini elections seriously?

I interviewed Ambassador Shaikh Abdul Aziz Al Khalifa, the former Bahrain Ambassador to the UK and the international media advisor at the Information Affairs Authority of Bahrain, before the Bahraini government attempted to close Al-Wifaq. Al Khalifa went back-and-forth as to whether to accept that there could be a legitimate Shiite grievance in Bahrain. At the end, he chose to blame outside intervention in their domestic affairs. “When you have the Iranian television channels, Alalam, Al-Manar, Ahlulbayt, Press TV, the Hezbollah channels, that are stirring poison and encouraging the protestors to keep their stand and giving support to the Shiite movement in Bahrain, that’s not helpful,” he said. “We believe this is a direct interference in Bahrain’s internal politics.”

Al Khalifa was also critical of the Iraqi government. “I think the Iraqi parliament went to a 10 day vacation in Baghdad in solidarity with the Shiites in Bahrain. The [Iraqi] prime minister is making other inflammatory remarks supporting Shiites. What’s this?” asked the Bahraini international media advisor. “If there is anything that he can offer, he must [admit] that ‘We went through a civil war. We had to come up with conciliatory program. Can we do something for you?’” The fact is that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, also a Shiite, suspended the parliament’s work briefly and expressed concern “that the events in Bahrain could unleash a regional sectarian war like the one that menaced Iraq just a few years ago.”

The Guardian, a British daily newspaper, recently detailed a chilling account of how the Saudi soldiers wage a campaign of sectarian violence. Mahmoud, a Bahraini Shia, shares his eye-witness account. “They managed to catch two people, aged no more than 30, and were beating them up badly, swearing at them all the time and cursing the Shia clerics, saying: “Where is al-Khomeini now? Where is al-Sistani, you Shia dogs?” he tells. “They say that we are spies for Iran, but nobody here wants to be ruled from Iran. We are Shia, but we are also Arabs, not Persians. We do not want help from Iran. We want democracy in our own country.”

Indeed, I was curious about why there were early reports that the Bahraini government was considering talks with the opposition, but any mention of the “talks about talks” is no longer.

Ambassador Al Khalifa claimed that the Crown Prince met the opposition’s demands to begin talks.  “We were asking for dialogue for one month, and there was no reciprocation from the opposition. They increased their demands and added the precondition. Now we have the upper hand and have another problem: the Sunni camp is so angry, we were put through hell, our lives were totally disrupted and now we don’t want to hear anything about dialogue, we believe in reforms, but we don’t need the style of protestors and for the protestors to be rewarded,” he said. “So we have a problem now that the Sunnis are reluctant to have this dialogue. I think the official line from the government is this: Once law and order is restored fully then we can think about having a national dialogue that will include both Sunnis and Shias for a better Bahrain.”

It’s stunning that the international community takes a selective approach toward human rights and democracy in the Middle East, and does nothing about Bahrain. The situation brings the Saudi and Iranian political circumstances to the forefront, and shows how they use religion and victimize people in their power game. The Shiites have legitimate grievances and they need to be given comfort, not military suppression. The Bahraini Ambassador admitted that the military presence is not sustainable, but what is the solution? “On the ground, the purge against Shiite workers in government and parastatal jobs continues,” a friend in Bahrain tells me. “[A] nd new regulations making it easier to hire foreigners send a clear signal that they are trying to squeeze the Shi’a out.”

Why is it so difficult for Muslim leaders to accept responsibility for their own mistakes and find ways to deal with the issue? When will it be the time to stand up for human dignity without worrying about power and political benefit?

For the last few years Turkey has been trying to sell itself as the re-shaper of the Middle East. But now that the region is reshaping itself in dramatic and unexpected ways, the late, lame and confusing responses of Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan’s government show that Turkey’s renewed activism in its Muslim neighbourhood has not gone very far.

No one knows how the Arab Spring will end — but it’s clear that with this awakening, the Arab people have nullified all of the narratives that others have used to describe them. Their endless tolerance and surrender to victimhood at the hands of their authoritarian rulers finally ran out. Many feel so desperate that they no longer care whether they lose their lives by taking to the streets. Since February, thousands have indeed paid the ultimate price, but with a purpose: they want change.

Turkey was surprised by this Arab uprising. For years now, Erdogan has tried to play to the Arab street like an Ottoman sultan. He has accused Israel of being a terrorist state murdering Palestinians, scoring points off an easy and unpopular target, especially when he stormed off the stage at the World Economic Forum in Davos after a heated debate with the Israeli president over Gaza.

He has provoked controversy in other ways too, for instance he has said that a Muslim cannot commit genocide, and the situation in Darfur can’t be considered one. Erdogan has even received a human rights award from Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi.

But he has always defended the status quo in the Arab region and never questioned the Muslim leadership in any of these countries. And although Erdogan was quick to call for Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to step down, he could not display such a muscular and forceful attitude toward the Libyan leader. Erdogan had a bad personal relationship with Mubarak, but Turkish firms have business deals in Libya worth more than 15 billion US dollars.

And Erdogan never once entered into a public discussion about the grave problems of misconduct, corruption, bribery, tribalism, unemployment and more in these countries — which actually killed more Arab dreams than the Israelis.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict clearly is a problem in search of a peaceful solution. But it’s worth asking the question: is it really the biggest problem in the Middle East? The Arab Spring shows that Arab misrule is an even bigger and far more pervasive problem. And it’s no secret that all these oppressive Arab leaders have abused the Palestinian issue to distract attention from their own misdeeds. They have exploited Palestinian victimhood and refused to take any responsibility for all failed attempts at peace with Israel.

When there is massive poverty, illiteracy and unemployment, no one really believes that Israel or foreign intervention is what’s triggering these uprisings. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s speech last week demonstrates the emptiness of that argument. His people did not buy his claim that foreign conspirators are provoking events in Syria.

Erdogan said he will call Assad this week to ask about the reforms promised to the people. The Turkish prime minister claims his Middle East policy is a success based on his relationship with Assad, yet the Syrian leader is so far the only beneficiary of this relationship. Erdogan almost single-handedly ushered Assad from isolation back into the international community. His hosting of Syria-Israel proximity talks is a prime example. If a United States ambassador is in Damascus right now, one big reason is because of Turkey’s support for Assad.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia nearly cut ties with Assad six years ago, when former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated. Erdogan played a key role in mending the fences between the two leaders. Now King Abdullah refuses to support the Syrian Sunnis who want to bring down Assad, because he is afraid for his own regime. In any case, Turkey should remain removed from any attempt to intervene in Arab domestic affairs. Turks are not Arabs, and Erdogan’s fantasy love affair with the Arab world may not last for long.

While many in the region point to World War II as the start of all problems in the Middle East because of the Jewish state’s creation in 1948, the Arab Spring is actually all about the First World War. The Middle East is still trying to absorb the demise of the Ottoman Empire.

Turkey needs to turn away from the dead end fantasy that it the natural heir to the Ottoman imperial project. There is no hegemonic leadership role for Turkey to play in the region. As a leader, Erdogan should stay out of the individual dramas in the region. And he needs to understand that wherever uprisings take place, those are developments that the Arab people must work out for themselves.

In the modern era, Turkey will benefit tremendously from a democratic Arab world that focuses on improving education and economic development for its people. A democratized region will hopefully focus more on constructive thoughts than potential wars. But it’s going to take time to get there.

The Erdogan government’s priority now should be to determine its position toward a rapidly changing Middle East. Surely Israel-bashing will no longer work, unless Turkey chooses to play the role of provocateur to the region’s radicals.

Erdogan knows that NATO won’t expel its only Muslim nation, but Turkey’s allies are carefully watching how Erdogan is using the religion card and portraying NATO members as imperial powers who only want to exploit the Arab world’s energy resources.

Turkey is a strong and influential country in the region, but we should be cautious of an approach that sees Turkey taking a larger role as a model for the region and as a fixer for its various problems. Such a leadership role can only hurt Turkey’s own national interests and make it fall tired fighting for others, while it has to save that energy to perfect its democracy and advance its economic prosperity.

When the Arab Spring runs its course, Turkey will be the loser if it keeps pretending to the West that it is the leader and spokesman for the Muslim Middle East. The Ottoman Empire ended long ago. The Arabs can speak for themselves. And so can the Turks.

The regime of Bashar al-Assad may survive this threat, and the Syrian regime may quash the protests and kill many this week. But unlike their counterparts in Libya, Syrian anti-government protestors are alone in their fight. It’s nearly impossible to conceive that the Arab League would call upon the international community to intervene in Syria, which, according to Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, is necessary to legitimize any military action.

The Arab League’s back-and-forth on Libya created real confusion about its position on the situation in the region — and leaders in both the United States and Europe may find it impossible to persuade their governments and their citizens to engage in yet another war in a Muslim country. Given the criticism that both President Obama and French President Sarkozy are facing over how they proceeded with the use of force, the Libyan intervention may only serve to hide the problems of economic hardship on both sides of the Atlantic.

If Assad calculates that the West is tied up and decides to turn on his own people, it will only boost hatred toward his regime and aggravate the threat of a full-scale civil war. But Iran is the wild card in this Arab Awakening — and Syria is the one country that can lessen Iran’s influence in the region. But the international community may have already played its card in Libya, limiting its options for ending the Assad regime. As long as Assad remains in power, Iran’s position in the region will only become stronger. If and when the Syrian leadership changes, it won’t be a zero-sum game in its relationship with Iran and other radicals of the region. But the level of intimacy between Damascus and Tehran will change, and that will have huge implications for organizations like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.

Although the Arab League represents majority Sunni leadership and fears Iran’s growing influence, they have different interests. For example, Lebanese Sunni leader Saad Hariri might be the first to celebrate the end of the Assad era. He was recently forced out of his position as prime minister because he did not want to give up the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which investigated his father’s assassination six years ago. The tribunal is expected to hold Assad’s government and Hezbollah responsible of Rafik Hariri’s death. When the Syrian leader steps down, the Tribunal will have more freedom to make the announcement.

Yet Hariri also played Turkey against Iran when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a show with Hezbollah at the Israeli-Lebanon border. Soon after Ahmadinejad’s visit to Lebanon, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan was invited to Beirut — where he was welcomed by thousands like an “Ottoman Sultan.” Many in the Arab world see Erdogan as a balance to the rising Shia influence. They welcome his strong criticism of Israel, which breaks from the past Turkish leadership. To some, Erdogan is proof that Turkey is not a Western nation and has no place in European Union.

Building up Turkey’s “Sunni” identity is merely a ploy to draw Turkey and Iran into a fight. The Erdogan government’s “zero problem with neighbors policy” was unrealistic at best, but now Turkey must not intervene in Syria’s domestic affairs. Over the weekend, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates admitted that “regime change is a complicated thing.” Turkey could call on Syria to make good on its promises of economic and social reform in the face of growing unrest, but Erdogan’s priority has to be keeping any conflict from spilling over into Turkey. Despite the Turks’ growing unease with the West, Turkey has benefited a lot from its membership in NATO and its relationships with the United States and European Union countries.

Erdogan’s government, however, represents the first Turkish leadership in a post-Cold War, post-9/11 era. Past Turkish leaders, too, engaged in demagogy and criticized the West, but Turkey’s orientation with respect to the West was never in doubt as it is today. The reason: Erdogan’s skill with both politics and rhetoric are unmatched in the present context.

Erdogan opposed NATO intervention in Libya — before he was for it. “What has NATO got to do in Libya?” he asked. Now, however, Turkey is making the largest contribution to the NATO mission — with four frigates, a submarine and an auxillary warship to enforce the arms embargo off Libya. Erdogan was against using any bullets against Libyans, but that was before NATO agreed to protect the civilian anti-government protesters against Qaddafi’s forces. In fact, NATO member countries may question why Turks play the religion card each time it’s tested and don’t participate in NATO combat missions in Libya or in Afghanistan. Finally, Erdogan opposed any Western intervention in Libya because, “I wish that those who only see oil, gold mines, and underground treasures when they look in [Libya's] direction, would see the region through glasses of conscience from now on,” he said. He also conveniently misspoke about Turkey’s financial interests in Libya.

This demonstrates a pattern in Erdogan’s thinking, and confuses the perception about where Erdogan really wants the country to end up. The prime minister’s dislike of French President Sarkozy could hurt Turkey’s interests. The French were careful to move military operations under the NATO control, and now the alliance will oversee the aerial operations at its Izmir base. Although the Iraq war was not a NATO mission, Turks made it clear that they would not allow foreign troops to invade their neighbors via Turkish land.

In the end, although it is unlikely that there will be a NATO operation against the Syrian regime, Turkey may be cornered into deciding to continue aerial operations control in Izmir for the Syrian operation. And Erdogan may flip once again, though Sarkozy may not give him an easy exit this time out. It also raises the possibility that Turkey’s NATO membership could be called into question.

It will be a real problem if Assad’s regime survives the threat to its power, and if Turkey continues to do business with them — as usual. It will paint Turkey as moving even closer to the Iran-Syria-Hamas-Hezbollah leadership, which only stands for anti-American, anti-Western and anti-Israeli. On the other hand, it’s also clear that Assad’s era is nearing an end.

The Syrians will determine what happens to Assad — and while that is figured out, it’s crucial that Turkey not get involved in the fight. The West can’t give Turkey anything to sell out Assad, or to make things work against him. Turks have tried in the past to negotiate between the Syrians and Israelis, and while they thought it would drive a wedge between Syria from Iran, they just moved closer. Turkey should learn from that experience. Erdogan’s priority has to be keeping any conflict from spilling over into Turkey.

The tug-of-war over Turkey’s identity has become a major topic of foreign policy debate over the past few years. To deny the obvious, that it is not accepted as a natural European power, and that its Middle Eastern blood weighs heavier in its current politics, is impossible. Yet Turkey’s European roots and its longstanding ties to Western institutions keep it from identifying solely with its Middle Eastern neighbors. And it is that dichotomy that creates a momentous opportunity for Turkey to forge its own path in a changing world.

Turkey’s neighborhood has changed immensely since Sept. 11, 2001. American military action in Iraq and Afghanistan has not made the region safer or more stable – and American credibility has taken a big hit. Its unilateral superpower standing is gone in the past decade. Meanwhile the worldwide financial meltdown has also hit Europe hard, and there is a sense that the Western bloc is in decline. While it is still a big unknown as to what is emerging as the “new world order”, given the regional dynamics, it is vital that Turkey increase its cooperation with the Arab world. With the world’s 16th largest economy and with a majority of its population young, it has to keep its eyes open for the best interests of the nation.

Turkey faces two key questions. First, what will be its place and role in the new world?  Second and perhaps even more important, what role Islam will play in Turkey? Despite 88 years of effort, Turks still have yet to prove that Islam and democracy can coexist harmoniously. The current government, rooted in political Islam, argues that previous Turkish leaders have been hostile to Islamic traditions – and that Turkey is now normalizing. Others take a different view.

A NATION DIVIDED

The government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is leading Turkey in an unmistakably Islamist direction. Turkish society has always been conservative, but that element is being accentuated, especially when it comes to issues like women’s attire, women in the workplace, relationships between men and women and alcohol consumption.

The government’s new restrictions on alcohol are a prime example of increased conservatism. While Erdogan claims that he is following the constitution and protecting young adults from alcoholism, he also argues that making it more difficult for catering companies to serve alcohol at weddings and other events is a way to fit in with European norms. While there is an ongoing controversy and confusion over new restrictions placed on alcohol consumption in European nations, Erdogan’s comments on alcohol mark him as radically different to any European leader’s approach to alcohol consumption. Rather, in a slang language, which is literally impossible to translate into English yet nonetheless evokes the same sentiment, he exclaimed that he does not say a thing to those who drink alcohol until they “continuously sneeze and wheeze.” Last year, he said he could not understand why people drink wine while they could just eat grapes.

The point here is that a growing sensitivity to religious rules in Turkey is fueling a culture war. Support for the AKP is hard to come by on the coasts, from Istanbul to the Aegean and the Mediterranean; in fact, these regions are increasingly distressed by the direction of Turkey’s leadership. Erdogan’s government owes it to the citizens of Turkey to address these differences, and to clarify what it means by saying it is moving to “normalizing” the country and how it will stay away from becoming an Islamic Republic.

The Islamic republic of Pakistan, which represents a far stricter interpretation of Islam, for example, represents a cause for worry, particularly in light of the recent killing of Salman Taseer, the liberal governor of Punjab, over his opposition to blasphemy laws. The Pakistani reaction that his words brought about his assassination sends a chill through anyone who cherishes freedom and rule of law. While it will be a gross exaggeration to depict Turkish society as a whole as intolerant to people’s differences, its society is undeniably becoming more polarized. Therefore, one wonders if Erdogan worries Turkey turning into a Pakistan-style Islamic republic.

Erdogan’s obsession with Israel is a matter of concern to say the least. His comments on Middle East foreign policy, from his January 2009 outburst at Davos onwards, almost inevitably end with a verbal assault on Israel’s transgressions. Yet when it comes to any Muslim leader – even like Libyan leader Moammar Kaddafi who murders his own people in cold blood, he takes an exceptionally cautious approach in criticizing his insane acts of violence. To Erdogan, Israel has become an easy whipping target. He does not recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization and expresses no regret and no condolences when Israeli civilians are killed. As Erdogan’s constant rhetorical assaults on Israel and therefore the U.S. won over the Arab street, it also has a profound effect on Turkish public opinion, convincing Turks that it is Israel and the U.S. that are the primary threats to peace. This is the political environment in which Turkish identity and its national security interests are being redefined.

PROBLEM IN POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

When the Turkish government tilts more heavily toward the Muslim Middle East, tension within the nation inevitably increases. But some evolving democracies like Turkey are beset with problems from the unresolved business of the past, which continues to haunt the present. Since its foundation, secularism and the Kurdish identity have been extremely sensitive issues in Turkey. Unless the country can find a way to unify, it is difficult to talk about peace and even preserving its youth and vigor.

In Turkey, many argue that one can overcome these challenges with a stronger democracy. In fact, the ruling AKP party claims the burgeoning democratization of Turkey as its greatest achievement. The AKP machine argues that the authoritarian chapter of the country’s history is drawing to a close, and a new democratic chapter is beginning. But Turkish democracy is hardly Athenian; under the 1982 military constitution, parties must receive a 10 percent vote to gain representation in Parliament. Parties must also reach a seven-percent threshold to be eligible to receive money from the state treasury. These restrictions were put in place by the 1982 military constitution. In brief, the state targeted its Kurdish origin citizens and took severe measures to keep them away from political participation.

One of the most frequently cited arguments about Prime Minister Erdogan is that there is no alternative. But the truth is more complicated. The state apparatus failed to solve the above mentioned issues in timely manner, was caught off guard.  Many believed that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was also meant to create an independent Kurdistan carving land from Turkey. When the AKP came to power for the first time in 2002, the voters simply wanted to give a lesson to the old guards who never fixed the country’s economic problems and were the targets of unending corruption allegations. While the conditions brought AKP to power, the Turkish state decided to back Erdogan too. It was perceived to be to the interest of the Turkish state to have AKP controlling all the east and southeastern provinces in Parliament.

To dig deeper into the AKP support, it is key to examine election results. In AKP’s first election, 46.5 percent of the Turkish electorate voted for candidates who were unable to reach the 10 percent threshold to get into Parliament. In the 2007 election, AKP claimed two and a half million fewer votes than the parties who reached the 10 percent threshold and below. In other words, Turkish democracy has a core problem in its representation and a large number of voters are not represented in the government.

These core handicaps make it tough to assess what is really happening in Turkey. After two terms, AKP is more in control of the country than ever. It has overhauled the military, justice and education systems – for the better, it claims. Yet, 42 percent of the population strongly disagrees. After the worldwide economic meltdown, unemployment has once again become the Turks’ main concern. While the AKP talks about strengthening Turkey’s democracy, one of the main tenets of democratic government is ensuring accountability. The powerful should be accountable to the people. In today’s Turkey, there is no system of checks and balances.

OLD GUARDS ADIEU

Now, it seems that power is beginning to change hands. The credibility of state institutions has been worn down. The AKP has taken over these institutions and is looking to eliminate the old guards, implying that Turkey’s politically religious and secular communities cannot coexist peaceably. And the two populations seem to be drifting further apart under the AKP’s leadership.

The AKP is seeking a third term in the June elections. Erdogan has promised to his constituency that he will change the constitution in his next term, considering changing Turkey’s government from a parliamentary system to a presidential one. These changes could be good for the country, but once again Erdogan’s talk about “normalizing” the country remains confusing.

Turks have to decide who they want to become, and what their future should hold. At the end of the day, the identity issue is really less about the West pushing Turkey away or the Middle East embracing it. Both depictions are untrue and only Turkey itself can decide what place it wants to take in the new world and what kind of role it wants for Islam.

The Middle East is transforming so quickly that no one knows what the outcome will look like. One thing, however is clear: we are in a race against time — rather a limited one — to prevent the region’s radicals from taking advantage of the changing environment and making things worse. While each country that has experienced upheaval is different, they all face one fundamental problem. They created a myth about holding higher moral values, but with respect to justice and rule of law they lacked real substance and wherewithal. Now, with the citizens of these Arab nations wanting to claim their freedom and experience economic prosperity, the opportunity arises for Arab expatriates to have a real impact on the future of the region. They can bring back to the Middle East the knowledge and talent that was lost when they either chose or were forced to leave for the West, and help build a new future for the region. They can create an Arab Expat Peace Corps, which would work closely with NGOs, think tanks, academy and governments all over the world.

Such an organization would accomplish two key missions. First, the volunteers would be able to help build something much bigger than themselves, fueled by a genuine desire to create a free, prosperous region and greater understanding about and within the Arab world. Second, it would help to bridge the gap between the Middle East and the Western world, and would create a support system to rebuild the region. With positive alliances working toward a common goal — a modernized Arab world — the task would be far less overwhelming.

Clearly there will be obstacles — distrust is likely to arise between the Islamists and those who embrace more secular values. Some may also have difficulty in embracing the good will of the expatriates and see them as agents of foreign governments. That tension could derail meaningful work. And some of the Arab leaders, both established and opposition, might not be so willing to put their egos aside enough to look forward to create something new rather than be motivated by generations of oppression and strife.

A million details and what-ifs could derail this nascent idea. Is such a proposition realistic? Who would be in charge? How would it work? But that doesn’t mean that anyone with a stake in the future of the Middle East — which is everyone — should turn away from any possible solution or means of defeating radicalism. There are many educated, intellectual, secular and liberal minds in the Arab world — but they haven’t yet proven their will to defeat the extreme elements within their own societies. They haven’t made a strong enough stand for freedom, development and economic well-being, all of which can help a sense of security flourish.

It’s easy to talk about democracy and freedom, and blame those who cast doubt on how the transformation will take place. But haven’t Arab leaders been the ones showing the world that they don’t care about their people? Didn’t they teach everyone else that their people are not valuable?

The findings of the 2002 United Nations Arab Human Development Report, for example, tell quite a story. No one could have predicted that a Tunisian man named Mohammed Bouazizi would set himself on fire and trigger protests and riots that would lead to the fall of Tunisian leader Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and become a catalyst for popular rebellions throughout the Arabian peninsula. But we did know that something was stirring, and no one did a thing about it.

The 2002 UN report confirmed the huge problems of illiteracy, poverty and unemployment in the Arabic-speaking world. It found that approximately 40 percent of adult Arabs — 65 million people — are illiterate, and unfortunately, that two-thirds of those adults are women. It found that 50 million young people would enter the labor market by 2010, and another 100 million by 2020, and made clear that six million new jobs are needed each year to keep up. The report also warned that if current jobless rates persist, unemployment in the region would reach 25 million by 2010.

The Arab Spring is a testament to the fact that no one addressed these problems. The people are demonstrating not for democracy, but rather for jobs and economic security. They remained passive for many years, but knowing that the current leaders’ sons were destined to succeed them painted a picture of an ongoing status quo that would never benefit regular citizens. Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak was preparing for his son Gamal to replace him after three decades in office. Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh planned to turn the country over to his son Ahmed when he stepped down after more than 30 years. Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi is the longest serving head of state in this group — in power for 42 years, he, too, was preparing to turn his authority over to his son Saif al-Islam. And the people resented this — possibly — the mostest.

Turkey was lauded as a “model” for Arab countries when then-President George W. Bush introduced the Broader Middle East Initiative in 2003 at a G8 summit, using the 2002 UN report as a key document. Turkey became a co-chair of the initiative and since then has increased its trade with many Arab countries, though many conveniently deny that no one would walk away from the opportunity to make money in the midst of an economic crisis. Yet Turkey became popular on the Arab street because its prime minister, Recep Tayip Erdogan, used Israel as a whipping boy. And today’s reality in Tunis; in Cairo; in Bengazi and elsewhere shows that the heart of the issue is not about Israel — for a change. And Turkey’s leadership role to the Arabic-speaking world is limited. There will be an Arab model for fixing the Arab problems.

Arabs, however, have been programed to hate Israel, partly because they were unable to criticize their own governments. Their respective governments fed victimhood at the hands of the West into their national identity. The Arab leadership said one thing to their Western counterparts, and totally another thing to their people. Therefore, it is only natural that outsiders are skeptical about the possible outcome of the Arab Spring. In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood may be treading carefully, though not because it has adopted the tenets of democracy. The group does know, however, that even a magician could not meet the people’s expectations and elevate their economic status in just one term in office. The Middle East has lost not only 10 years since the UN report’s warnings and calls to action to create jobs. With the region’s decades of chronic corruption, it also lost the people’s faith. Arabs will eventually start feeling frustrated again, creating an opportunity for the Muslim Brotherhood to come in and take over — and today’s “velvet revolution” will then be crashed by Muslim Brotherhood’s “iron fist.” Maybe, maybe, though, Arab Expat Peace Corps will be the solution to avert such an outcome. What do you think?

During a visit to MIT last week, Crowley was asked “to address “the elephant in the room.” What did Crowley think…about Wikileaks?” wrote BBC reporter Phillipa Thomas on her blog.” About the United States, in his words, “torturing a prisoner in a military brig?”

Crowley’s answer was sharp and pointed. “What’s being done to Bradley Manning by my colleagues at the Department of Defense “is ridiculous and counterproductive and stupid…Nonetheless, Bradley Manning is in the right place.”

Crowley deserves a great deal of praise for his bravity and integrity for not shying away from standing up for his principles and values.

“The unauthorized disclosure of classified information is a serious crime under U.S. law,” he said in a written statement on his departure Sunday. “My recent comments regarding the conditions of the pre-trial detention of Private First Class Bradley Manning were intended to highlight the broader, even strategic impact of discreet actions undertaken by national security agencies every day and their impact on our global standing and leadership…The exercise of power in today’s challenging times and relentless media environment must be prudent and consistent with our laws and values.”

Amnesty International recently was raising concerns that he has been confined to a windowless cell for 23 hours a day and that he is stripped down to his boxers at night and is not given pillows or blankets. CNN reports that his lawyer also “says the young private recently had to sleep in the nude because defense officials thought there was a suicide threat and decided to take away his boxer shorts.”

Crowley will be replaced by Michael Hammer, a White House spokesman.

By David Gardner in London
Published: March 8 2011 20:18 | Last updated: March 8 2011 20:18

The young revolutionaries of Egypt and Tunisia, after toppling Hosni Mubarak and Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali, have managed to cleanse government of their henchmen and are now starting on their police state enforcers. Yet, while their thirst for political reform is unquenchable, little has emerged about their attitude towards the economic reforms their countries desperately need.

That debate, when it comes, could be as wrenching as the political upheaval. That is because the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes, which ran their economies as rackets for a tight circle of kleptocrats and concessionaires, may have discredited the very idea of reform.

That discredit is the greater insofar as Egypt and Tunisia were held up by bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank as pioneers of economic reform in the region, while what Egyptians and Tunisians saw was cronyism and regime maintenance. The alibi peddled by western governments and their Arab clients that “structural reform” could unlock political reform – “give us some liberals to liberalise with” as one US ambassador to Cairo put it – was laughable.

Egypt did at times engage technocrats in a theoretically credible attempt to chart a transition from a command economy dominated by the public sector to an investment-powered, export-led, high growth model. Measures such as limited privatisation did, indeed, seed a perceptible rise in investment. But a closer examination of policy would have revealed a picture of mutation rather than change.

Privatisation, for example, invariably favoured regime loyalists such as steel baron Ahmed Ezz, who became a leader of Mr Mubarak’s ruling party and ally of his banker son, Gamal Mubarak. Mr Ezz is facing charges relating to his business and political activities, while the Mubarak family’s assets are frozen. By parcelling out concessions to loyalist businessmen, a regime based on the military and security services expanded its base. Genuine reforms – including changes to corporate law ordered by Mr Mubarak – were vetoed by the security apparatchiks as curbs on their discretionary powers. So, instead of confronting an insiders’ economy, the regime widened the circle of insiders.

In this cat’s cradle of mutual enrichment, scores of businessmen went into parliament – a seat of patronage rather than power – while retired officers remuneratively graced their company boards. In this “sinister cohabitation between power and capital”, as Nader Fergany, the Egyptian lead author of the UN’s 2002 Arab Human Development Report, called it, a particularly indolent form of crony capitalism thrived, but the bulk of Egyptians did not.

The number of Egyptians living on or below $2 a day grew from 39 to 43 per cent on Mr Mubarak’s watch. From 2005, after reform resumed, his government had to triple spending on food and fuel subsidies from 8.1 per cent to 26.1 per cent of current government expenditures. Spending on schools and infrastructure shrivelled. Now, by IMF reckoning, Egypt’s economy needs to grow by 10 per cent each year for the next decade just to absorb the   currently unemployed and new entrants to the workforce.

The crisis has led to strikes releasing bottled-up demands for better pay and conditions. Much of the economy is at a standstill.

Egypt has until now managed to stumble on as a skewed rentier economy of a different kind to the oil-rich Gulf model, earning between two-thirds and three-quarters of its foreign exchange from foreign aid, gas sales, Suez Canal fees, remittances and tourism. The military, furthermore, is insulated by its own business empire, with most of its weaponry provided for by a $1.3bn annual US stipend.

What Egypt needs is a modern education system to unlock the reservoir of talent of its 85m people. It needs law-based institutions. It needs a competitive environment to attract the right investment. There is so much upheaval still to come.

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